Corruption and Protests in Serbia in 2025

Corruption in Serbia is deeply entrenched and affects politics, public procurement, the judiciary and major infrastructure projects. Under President Aleksandar Vučić and his governing Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), democratic checks and balances have eroded and state institutions are captured by a clientelist network. The collapse of a concrete canopy at the Novi Sad railway station in November 2024, which killed 15 people, triggered the largest anti‑corruption protests in Serbia’s modern history. These protests continued throughout 2025, drawing students, farmers, teachers and other citizens into a broad movement demanding accountability and transparency. International organisations, including the Council of Europe and the European Union, have voiced concerns about the heavy‑handed response of the authorities and Serbia’s declining rule of law[1][2].

Corruption Indicators

Indicator Score and rank Comment
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2024 Serbia scored 35 / 100 and ranked 105th of 180 countries[3]. The long‑term decline suggests growing perception of public‑sector corruption and executive dominance.
Public Integrity Index (IPI) Integrity score 7.35 / 10 and transparency score 15.5 / 20[4]. The index highlights strengths such as budget transparency but flags low judicial independence and moderate press freedom.
Freedom House – Nations in Transit 2024 Democracy score **3.61 / 7**; Serbia is classified as a **hybrid regime**[5]. Freedom House points to political interference in the judiciary, restrictions on media and lack of real progress in fighting high‑level corruption.

Institutional and Legal Framework

National Anti‑Corruption Strategy (2024–2028)

Serbia adopted a National Anti‑Corruption Strategy in July 2024. The European Commission notes that while the strategy aims to address legislative gaps and increase investigations, the accompanying action plan is still pending[6]. An analysis by the Anti‑Corruption Portal highlights that only 76 % of measures from a previous 2021 plan were implemented and that corruption indicators continued to deteriorate[7]. The new strategy proposes amending laws on organised crime and corruption, strengthening asset confiscation, establishing a digital register of corruption cases and improving oversight of party finances[7].

EU Rule of Law Report 2025

The European Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law Report acknowledges some progress in judicial reforms but stresses that political pressure on the judiciary and prosecution services remains high. Investigations into the Novi Sad canopy collapse are ongoing, and the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime lacks a clear mandate, leading to inconsistent actions in corruption cases. Establishing a track record of investigations, indictments and final convictions in high‑level cases, including asset confiscation, remains a challenge[2]. Oversight of public procurement is weak, with exemptions widely used to circumvent the law, and a new media law adopted in June 2025 has yet to ensure the independence of the media regulator REM[2].

Weaknesses in Enforcement

Despite a relatively comprehensive legal framework, Serbia struggles to enforce anti‑corruption laws. The Anti‑Corruption Council actively exposes cases but receives little follow‑up from other institutions[2]. Verification of asset declarations and conflicts of interest remains weak, and the Law on lobbying has limited scope and effectiveness. Public procurement exemptions continue to be widely used, whistle‑blowers lack protection, and independent oversight bodies face resource constraints[2].

Systemic Issues and Drivers of Corruption and protests in Serbia

Political Dominance and Clientelism

Serbia’s political system is dominated by President Vučić and the SNS, which control parliament and key state institutions. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index describes Serbia as having weak parliamentary oversight and an overbearing executive; the judiciary suffers from inefficiency, nepotism and corruption[9]. These conditions foster clientelist networks that sustain the ruling party’s grip on power.

Selective Prosecution and Weak Rule of Law

Freedom House reports that high‑level corruption investigations often stall or target political opponents. Prosecutors have been reassigned after initiating sensitive cases, raising doubts about the independence of the judiciary[5]. Even when laws are improved on paper, they are undermined by special legislation: for example, major projects such as **EXPO 2027** and the national stadium are exempt from public procurement rules, mirroring patterns of opaque interstate agreements[5][8].

Public Procurement and Interstate Deals

Large infrastructure projects are often awarded through interstate agreements or special laws, bypassing competitive bidding. Transparency International notes that the “Serbia 2027” investment programme and preparations for EXPO 2027, valued at US$18.5 billion, rely on such agreements and sidestep anti‑corruption safeguards[8]. The EU’s 2025 rule of law report warns that exemptions to the public procurement law are widely used and that oversight mechanisms are insufficient[2].

Media Freedom and Civil Society

Investigative journalists and civil society organisations face harassment, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) and smear campaigns. Freedom House highlights the continued lack of independence of the public broadcaster and the media regulator REM, while new media laws have not improved editorial autonomy[5][2]. Independent oversight bodies and civil society organisations remain under‑resourced and face increasing pressure[2].

External Influences and EU Accession

China has emerged as a major infrastructure partner in Serbia, financing roads, railways and energy projects. A July 2025 commentary by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) argues that these investments often ignore environmental and labour standards and lack transparency, undermining EU accession criteria. CEPS criticises the EU for overlooking police violence and corruption in Serbia for geopolitical reasons and recommends targeted sanctions on Serbian officials, suspension of pre‑accession funds until credible anti‑corruption results are delivered and greater support for civil society[10]. Analysts note that Serbia’s corruption is one of the main obstacles to its EU membership, and progress remains stalled despite formal negotiations[11].

Recent Events: Protests and Human Rights Concerns (2024–2025)

Novi Sad Canopy Collapse and Protest Movement

On 1 November 2024, a newly renovated concrete canopy at the entrance to Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 15 people. An investigation revealed that the reconstruction project had been awarded without an open tender and lacked transparency in contracting. The tragedy ignited massive protests led by university students; tens of thousands blocked bridges and roads, demanding accountability, new elections and the resignation of officials linked to the project[12]. Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, who had been mayor of Novi Sad during the reconstruction, resigned amid mounting pressure[12].

Escalation of Protests in 2025

The protest movement broadened in 2025 to demand democratic reforms and an end to corruption. By June, tens of thousands of demonstrators called for snap elections, a review of voter registries, equal access to media, fair wages for educators and greater university autonomy[13]. Student groups erected barricades and clashed with police, while authorities labelled them “terrorists” and alleged foreign funding. Riot police detained dozens of protesters and used force, causing injuries. The Council of Europe’s human rights commissioner Michael O’Flaherty condemned the excessive force, arbitrary detentions and mischaracterisation of protesters and urged respect for the right to peaceful assembly[1]. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International also called on Serbian authorities to respect the rights of demonstrators[1].

Impact on EU Accession and International Image

Observers warn that continued violence and lack of accountability could jeopardise Serbia’s EU accession. The EU’s 2025 rule of law report recognises ongoing investigations into the canopy collapse but emphasises the need for credible prosecutions and stronger institutional independence[2]. CEPS recommends that the EU reconsider its strategic compromises and impose conditions on funding to ensure genuine reform[10]. Public trust in institutions remains low, and the mass mobilisations indicate a tipping point for Serbian society.

Impact on Society and Economy

Human costs: The Novi Sad disaster underscores how corruption in public procurement can directly result in loss of life. The protest movement frames corruption not just as a financial problem but as a threat to public safety and dignity.

Economic consequences: Corruption raises project costs and deters investors. The EU provides pre‑accession assistance to Serbia—about €165 million in 2023—but ties disbursements to rule‑of‑law reforms[11]. Continued corruption and political instability risk the suspension of funding and deter foreign direct investment.

Migration and social trust: Persistent corruption and perceived impunity contribute to emigration of skilled workers and undermine trust in government. The protests reveal a generation of young citizens increasingly unwilling to tolerate systemic corruption[12].

Conclusion and Outlook

Serbia remains mired in systemic corruption, intertwined with an authoritarian political environment. The National Anti‑Corruption Strategy provides a roadmap for reform but must be backed by a credible action plan and robust enforcement. The EU’s 2025 rule of law report underscores progress in judicial reforms while highlighting enduring weaknesses: politicised prosecution, under‑resourced oversight bodies and loopholes in public procurement[2]. The Novi Sad canopy collapse and ensuing protests have galvanised Serbian society and attracted international attention to state capture and impunity. Sustainable change will require strengthening the independence of the judiciary and prosecution services, ensuring transparency and competition in public procurement, protecting investigative journalists and civil society from harassment, and aligning EU support with tangible anti‑corruption outcomes[10]. The coming months will test whether the government will heed citizens’ demands for accountability or continue to rely on repression and patronage networks.

  1. Citations from AP News, JURIST and US News articles reporting on the Council of Europe’s condemnation of heavy‑handed police responses and human rights groups urging restraint【830091612897800†L2041-L2124】【638891865532885†L81-L121】【873020223250950†L112-L175】.
  2. Citations from the European Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law Report describing the adoption of the national anti‑corruption strategy, ongoing investigations into the Novi Sad canopy collapse, weaknesses in the Prosecutor’s Office, pervasive use of public procurement exemptions, and concerns about media independence【85863850232034†L55-L103】.
  3. Citations from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index summarising Serbia’s 2024 score and ranking【799141418586690†L856-L871】【799141418586690†L877-L881】.
  4. Citations from the Public Integrity Index dataset on Serbia’s integrity and transparency scores, highlighting low judicial independence and moderate press freedom【962330908618429†L64-L73】【962330908618429†L88-L103】.
  5. Citations from Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2024 report on Serbia’s democracy score, political interference in the judiciary, procurement law exemptions and media freedom issues【128339965812780†L62-L71】【128339965812780†L249-L299】【128339965812780†L266-L272】【128339965812780†L295-L298】.
  6. Citations from the European Commission’s 2024 progress report on Serbia (country report) noting adoption of the national anti‑corruption strategy and the lack of a detailed action plan【932942865945551†L389-L432】【932942865945551†L399-L407】.
  7. Citations from the Anti‑Corruption Portal’s summary of Serbia’s national anti‑corruption strategy outlining its objectives and noting that only 76 % of measures from the previous plan were implemented【945695101856796†L46-L87】【945695101856796†L88-L117】.
  8. Citations from Transparency International articles describing Serbia’s reliance on interstate agreements for large projects such as EXPO 2027 and the “Serbia 2027” investment programme【255390244709053†L934-L937】.
  9. Citations from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and related analyses highlighting inefficiency, nepotism and corruption in Serbia’s judiciary and the dominance of President Vučić and his party【590571913554911†L90-L99】【949063064569449†L70-L86】.
  10. Citations from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) commentary criticising the EU’s strategic compromises, China’s opaque investments and calling for targeted sanctions and suspension of pre‑accession funds until credible reforms are delivered【671821926654740†L281-L327】.
  11. Citations from FrontierView analysis on Serbia’s corruption and EU accession prospects, including references to EU pre‑accession funding and obstacles to membership【907041281148204†L105-L117】【907041281148204†L115-L124】.
  12. Citations from reports on the Novi Sad canopy collapse and protests (Guardian, International IDEA and related sources) detailing the circumstances of the collapse, scale of the protests, resignation of the prime minister and continued mobilisation【720286817857962†L150-L170】【720286817857962†L161-L180】【720286817857962†L216-L226】【272962975747311†L637-L651】.
  13. Citations from the Al Jazeera report describing protestors’ demands for snap elections, voter registry review, media access, education reforms and clashes with police【1808511814089†L80-L170】.

 

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